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REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE UNITED NATIONS INTERIM FORCE IN LEBANON

(for the period 25 July 1990-22 January 1991)

Addendum

Note by the Secretary-General

Paragraph 2 of my report of 22 January 1991 to the Security Council (S/22129) refers to the review of the scale and deployment of UNIFIL which the Security Council asked me to carry out on the occasion of the most recent renewal of UNIFIL's mandate on 31 July 1990. The attached document contains the report presented to me by the Secretariat team which, in consultation with the Force Commander of UNIFIL, has undertaken the review. It is circulated for the information of the members of the Council.

REVIEW OF UNIFIL'S SCALE AND DEPLOYMENT

INTRODUCTION

1. In informal consultations on 31 July 1990, the members of the Security Council agreed to request the Secretary-General that a review of the scale and deployment of UNIFIL be carried out by the Secretariat in the light of the performance by the Force of its functions since its establishment in 1978 and with a view to fully implementing resolution 425 (1978). This would provide the Council with a basis on which to assess whether existing arrangements for UNIFIL should be maintained or changed. This request was confirmed in a letter from the President of the Security Council to the Secretary-General dated 24 September 1990 (S/21833). The review has been carried out during the current mandate period by the Office for Special Political Affairs and the Force Commander. A separate review of UNIFIL's current arrangements for vehicle maintenance has been undertaken by a team led by the Deputy Director of Field Operations Division which visited UNIFIL in December 1990.

2. On 1 January 1991 the total strength of UNIFIL and Observer Group Lebanon (OGL) amounted to 6,480 persons, of whom 5,913 were military, 206 internationally recruited civilians and 361 locally recruited civilians. UNIFIL is the largest peace-keeping operation currently deployed, accounting for 55 per cent of all personnel in peace-keeping operations.

UNIFIL personnel, January 1991

	Military	International civilians	Local civilians	Total
Force HQ and Naqoura Camp Command	263	196	254	713
Six infantry battalions	4 293	-	100	4 393
Force Mobile Reserve	154	-	-	154
Logistic Units	1 143	-	-	1 143
Observer Group Lebanon	60	10	7	77
Total	5 913	206	361	6 480

3. The six infantry battalions maintained 95 observation posts (OPs), 45 checkpoints (CPs) and 29 combined OP/CPs. Of these 169 positions, 57 were inside the Israeli-controlled area (ICA). Observer Group Lebanon manned five additional OPs in the ICA.

4. The current annual cost of UNIFIL to the United Nations for the 1991 calendar year is approximately $152.7 million. This is equivalent to some 46 per cent of the estimated cost of all existing peace-keeping operations in 1991. The deficit on the UNIFIL special account on 1 January 1991 was $281.7 million, equivalent to almost two years' operations at current rates. This sum represents United Nations obligations to the troop-contributing Governments which the Secretary-General has been unable to pay because of the failure of some Member States to pay, in full and on time, their assessed share of the costs of UNIFIL.

I. UNIFIL'S PERFORMANCE OF ITS FUNCTIONS 1978-1990

Establishment of UNIFIL

5. When UNIFIL was established in 1978 the Israel-Lebanon sector had already experienced years of tension and recurrent violence. Especially after the move of Palestinian armed elements from Jordan to Lebanon in 1970, Palestinian commando operations against Israel and Israeli reprisals against Palestinian bases in Lebanon increased. The outbreak of the Lebanese civil war in April 1975 further aggravated the situation. In October 1976 a new government was established in Lebanon, following the establishment of a cease-fire and the deployment of the Arab Deterrent Force in most of the country. In the south, however, hostilities continued, mainly between Palestinian and allied Lebanese groups on the one hand and Christian irregulars supported by Israel on the other.

6. It is against this background that in March 1978, following a Palestinian raid north of Tel Aviv which resulted in numerous civilian casualties, Israel launched a military operation against the Palestinian bases south of the Litani and occupied a large part of that area. Agreement was quickly reached in the Security Council in favour of early United Nations action in southern Lebanon and the Council adopted resolutions 425 (1978) and 426 (1978), which established UNIFIL.

7. UNIFIL was conceived of as a quick and decisive way of addressing an immediate problem, a point that was emphasized by including the word "interim" in its name. At the same time, however, the Force was given a mandate which included tasks of a longer-term nature than simply confirming the withdrawal of Israeli forces. In the light of the conditions prevailing in the area, "restoring international peace and security" and "assisting the Government of Lebanon in ensuring the return of its effective authority in the area" proved to be far-reaching and ambitious objectives.

8. UNIFIL was envisaged as a two-stage operation. In the first stage, the Force would confirm the withdrawal of the Israeli forces from Lebanese territory. Once this was achieved, it would establish and maintain an area of operation, which was to be defined, after the Force had been established, in the light of its mandate. In this second stage it would supervise the cessation of hostilities, ensure the peaceful character of its area of operation, control movement and take all measures deemed necessary to assure the effective restoration of Lebanese sovereignty (S/12611, para. 6).

Essential requirements

9. It was clear from the start that UNIFIL would have to operate under extremely difficult conditions. The Secretary-General described in a forthright manner the requirements that would have to be met if the Force was to succeed. The most important of these was, of course, that the parties would take all the necessary steps for compliance with the Security Council's decisions and would co-operate with the Force in carrying out its mandate.

10. Those requirements were not met and the expectations implied in the Force's mandate were disappointed. Israel retained a degree of military power in the area by operating with and through the irregulars commanded at that time by Major Haddad and referred to in the Secretary-General's reports to the Security Council as the "de facto forces (DFF)". By this means Israel continued its fight against the PLO and its Lebanese allies (described in the reports as "armed elements") in southern Lebanon through operations aimed at isolating them and depriving them of their support among the population. This conflict involved violence both against individuals (e.g. blowing up of houses) and against whole villages (shelling). The PLO, for its part, tried to retain and strengthen its political and logistic bases in the area.

11. UNIFIL thus found itself between two enemies vying for influence over the very area which it was supposed to ensure was not utilized for hostile activities of any kind. It was prevented from deploying fully in the area that had been occupied by the Israeli forces and, in particular, could not deploy down to the armistice demarcation line, which was a prerequisite for restoring international peace and security. In addition, both sides tried constantly to encroach on or infiltrate into the area where UNIFIL was deployed, the better to carry on their fight against each other. UNIFIL's efforts to implement its mandate in these inauspicious conditions inevitably met with only partial success and caused the Force to suffer casualties unparalleled since the United Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC).

Efforts to restore government authority

12. Following UNIFIL's establishment, the Lebanese authorities and UNIFIL held extensive consultations concerning the restoration of government authority south of the Litani. The consultations focused on ways of bringing the Lebanese army to the UNIFIL area. That was, however, a complicated enterprise. The civil war had brought into the open deep divisions within the Lebanese population and these were inevitably reflected within the army, which was undergoing reorganization and reconstruction. Moreover, in moving to and from the UNIFIL area, the army was dependent on the co-operation of the various Palestinian and other groups which controlled the lines of communication between the capital and the south, notably the direct route along the coast. In addition, the Israeli authorities were opposed to the move. Nevertheless, the Government of Lebanon decided to dispatch a task force to the south and so informed the Secretary-General. The unit travelled on 31 July 1978 via the Bekaa valley. When it reached Kaoukaba (Norwegian battalion sector) it was subjected to heavy shelling by the de facto forces and eventually had to be withdrawn.

13. In January 1979, the Security Council invited the Lebanese Government to draw up, in consultation with the Secretary-General, a phased programme of activities to be implemented over the next three months to promote the restoration of its authority in southern Lebanon. Within this programme, a Lebanese army battalion was deployed in the UNIFIL area in April 1979, despite heavy shelling of the area and the UNIFIL headquarters in Naqoura by the de facto forces. The unit was reinforced in December 1980 and again in June 1981 and elements of it remain in the UNIFIL area. But the Lebanese army was not able, in the prevailing circumstances, to assume a significant role.

UNIFIL's operations 1978-1982

14. Meanwhile UNIFIL had set out to perform its task of ensuring the peaceful character of the area in which it had been possible for it to deploy. It did so by setting up checkpoints at points of entry and along the roads and inspecting vehicles and people for weapons and other military supplies. It also conducted patrols on foot and in vehicles in villages and along key routes, including certain wadis, and set up listening posts at night to detect movement. As UNIFIL had no police powers and the Lebanese authorities were not in a position to exercise their own powers, UNIFIL escorted out of its area of operation the uniformed or armed persons whom it intercepted.

15. Although such persons did not always go willingly and sometimes took revenge on UNIFIL for interfering in their activities, the relative mildness of the Force's actions actually contributed to its effectiveness, especially in intercepting Palestinian and Lebanese infiltrators. Those infiltrators, whose targets were Israel or Major Haddad's irregulars, did not feel threatened by UNIFIL soldiers, and the organizations which sent them had nothing to gain from fighting the United Nations. Interception by UNIFIL was no more than an inconvenience for them; its immediate effect was merely to delay (albeit again and again) missions that were, in any event, extremely hazardous. A second and important task was the protection of the villages that were caught in the struggle for influence and position between the two sides and sometimes between different groups on the same side. Major Haddad's de facto forces, in particular, frequently harassed villages in the UNIFIL area of deployment by shelling. In several instances, DFF or Israeli raiding parties managed to enter the UNIFIL area to abduct persons suspected of pro-Palestinian sentiments or to blow up their houses. UNIFIL also had to contend with attempts, some of them successful, by the de facto forces to set up positions within its area.

Reoccupation by Israel 1982-1985

16. Israel's second invasion of Lebanon in June 1982 changed UNIFIL's situation drastically. For three years, UNIFIL in its entirety remained behind the Israeli lines and this rendered moot any thought of implementing its original mandate. Its role was limited to providing protection and humanitarian assistance to the local population to the extent possible. Nevertheless the Force was kept in place, not least because of the hope that it might play an important role in the eventual withdrawal of the Israeli forces, whereupon it could carry out in full the tasks originally given to it by the Security Council.

17. After the initial invasion, the occupying forces maintained only a relatively limited presence in the UNIFIL area of deployment. UNIFIL continued to operate much as it had done before and to do what it could to prevent, in the interest of the population, the activities of armed irregulars. Controlled and supported by the Israeli forces, such irregulars attempted to set up checkpoints and patrol the villages. They were generally ill-disciplined and were deeply resented by the inhabitants. UNIFIL had standing instructions to disarm them and contain their activities, unless they were accompanied and directly supervised by the Israeli forces. UNIFIL could not, however, control the occupying forces themselves. It could only monitor their activities and report to the Secretary-General.

Withdrawal of Israeli forces 1985

18. In November 1984, the Secretary-General convened a conference of military representatives of Israel and Lebanon at UNIFIL headquarters in Naqoura to discuss the withdrawal of Israeli forces and related matters. These talks ended in January 1985 without agreement. Instead, on 14 January 1985 the Government of Israel announced its own plan for the redeployment of Israeli forces in three phases. In the last phase, those forces would be deployed along the armistice demarcation line, which is the internationally recognized boundary between Israel and Lebanon, while maintaining a "security zone" in southern Lebanon where local forces (the so-called "South Lebanon Army (SLA)") would function with Israeli backing. (The "South Lebanon Army" is the successor to Major Haddad's irregulars and, like them, is referred to as the "de facto forces (DFF)" in the Secretary-General's reports to the Security Council.)

Lebanese resistance activities

19. Although the UNIFIL area of operation had initially been relatively calm, opposition to the military occupation by Israel gradually increased and by February 1985 acts of harassment and guerrilla attacks against the Israeli forces by Lebanese resistance groups occurred frequently. In a statement on 27 February 1985 (S/17093, para. 24), the Secretary-General noted that UNIFIL was stationed in an area where active resistance against the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) was in progress and where the latter were engaged in active countermeasures. UNIFIL, for obvious reasons, had no right to impede Lebanese acts of resistance against the occupying forces, nor did it have the mandate or the means to prevent countermeasures. The Israeli occupation, and the resistance it had provoked, thus limited UNIFIL's ability to carry out its tasks of preventing the recurrence of fighting and ensuring the peaceful character of its area of operation. This anomaly in UNIFIL's position has essentially continued to this day.

Changes in UNIFIL's deployment in 1986

20. Following the partial withdrawal of Israeli forces which took place during the first half of 1985, UNIFIL redoubled its efforts to ensure the peaceful character of the area under its control and to provide humanitarian support to the civilian population in the area still controlled by Israel. The latter was larger than the area which had been under the control of the de facto forces before 1982 and now extended for a considerable distance to the north of the eastern part of the UNIFIL

area. UNIFIL's efforts in the area under its control led from time to time to confrontations with armed elements engaged in resistance activities against the Israeli occupation and the Force again began to take casualties on a disturbing scale.

21. In a grave series of incidents in the second half of 1986, 10 members of the Force were killed and some 50 wounded by hostile action. As a result, the Force reviewed its operations and made a number of adjustments in order to improve its own security by consolidating its deployment in fewer and stronger positions and concentrating its efforts for greater effectiveness.

22. For these reasons and for tactical purposes, UNIFIL divided its area of deployment into four parts which remain in effect to this day:

(a) The northwestern area lies north of a line from the southern part of the Tyre Pocket through Wadi Jilu to Tayr Falsayh. It comprises about half the Ghanaian battalion sector. In this area a comprehensive check on all vehicles would impose an unacceptable burden on the population because of the heavy traffic to and from Tyre. This is also an area where hostilities are less likely, since there is no direct confrontation between opposing sides. Emphasis is therefore placed on preventing the introduction into the area of long-range weapons, blocking hijackings and applying night restrictions on movement.

(b) The central area lies between the northwestern area and the area under Israeli control (ICA) in the western part of UNIFIL's area. It comprises the Fijian battalion sector, the Nepalese battalion sector, the northern part of the Irish battalion sector and the western half of the Finnish battalion sector. In this area UNIFIL endeavours to prevent the movement of any arms or armed personnel, except for certain persons permitted by UNIFIL to carry arms for purposes of public security. UNIFIL also applies night restrictions on movement.

(c) In the area under Israeli control (ICA) UNIFIL's freedom of movement is restricted, except in parts of the Finnish and Irish battalion sectors where UNIFIL was deployed before 1982. Here UNIFIL:

(i) Uses observation posts to monitor and report incidents as they occur;

(ii) Where it has freedom of movement, conducts patrols by day and night and provides protection and assistance to the local population by trying to block any incursions into villages traditionally under UNIFIL protection;

(iii) Where it does not enjoy freedom of movement, tries to induce restraint by establishing its presence and closely monitoring the activities of IDF and DFF.

(d) The Norwegian battalion sector is a special case because it is geographically separated from the rest of UNIFIL's area of deployment and since 1982 has lain entirely within the Israeli-controlled area. The Norwegian battalion has continued, in the interest of the population, to prevent the movement of any armed irregulars in its sector. This includes the DFF, unless they are accompanied

by and under direct supervision of IDF personnel. The IDF have been told that they should use only the main roads to reach their positions north and east of the sector and that they should not undertake military operations in it. These requirements were put forward because UNIFIL took the view that the sector had been generally quiet but would not remain so if the IDF operated there and thus brought its fight with the resistance into this area as well. The UNIFIL requirements were for some time respected by the IDF but since the summer of 1987 the Israeli forces have operated in the Norwegian battalion sector with increasing frequency, giving rise to a number of confrontations with UNIFIL that have been described in the Secretary-General's reports to the Security Council (see for instance S/19445, para. 16).

Efforts since 1985 to achieve implementation of resolution 425 (1978)

23. Since the failure of the Naqoura talks in early 1985, the Secretary-General has made every effort to persuade the Israeli authorities that, quite apart from their obligations under the Charter to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council, it is in Israel's own interest to co-operate in the full implementation of resolution 425 (1978). It has been pointed out that IDF and DFF military positions attract hostile actions which would not otherwise take place and that the local inhabitants' resentment of the treatment they receive from the IDF and the DFF makes it more, not less, likely that they will tolerate and sometimes assist the launching of attacks from their land against the occupation and even against Israel itself. The Israeli authorities have accordingly been urged to accept a programme for the complete withdrawal of their forces from Lebanese territory and the handing over of all IDF and DFF positions to UNIFIL, which, in co-operation with local Lebanese authorities, would ensure security in the border areas, pending full restoration of the central government's authority.

24. With one exception these urgings have not been accepted. The exception occurred in October 1987 when Israel withdrew the DFF from two positions on Tallet Huqban (see S/19445, paras. 12 and 13). The result, as predicted by UNIFIL, was a restoration of calm in the area and the peaceful repopulation of two large villages which had been regularly fired at from those positions. Unfortunately, the success of that move has not led Israel to repeat it elsewhere in spite of repeated urgings from the Secretary-General and the Force Commander to do so.

II. UNIFIL'S SITUATION IN JANUARY 1991

Political and military context

25. As described in the Secretary-General's reports to the Security Council, Israel continues to control, in large part through the DFF, a portion of southern Lebanon. A significant number of IDF remain deployed on Lebanese territory and these can be, and frequently are, rapidly reinforced with additional IDF from Israel itself. Israel has also begun to establish a civil administration in the area under its control. The IDF and DFF remain targets for attacks by Lebanese groups opposed to the occupation. For their part, the IDF and DFF react vigorously to these attacks, often with heavy weapons and with air support from Israel.

UNIFIL endeavours to carry out its mandate but continues to find itself between two fires.

26. The authority of the Lebanese Government remains gravely eroded. In the ICA, there remain few administrative structures owing allegiance to, or receiving funds from, the central government in Beirut. In other parts of UNIFIL's area, elements of the central administration are more in evidence, including a small detachment of the Lebanese Army and some gendarmerie. But their role in the maintenance of law and order is very limited and, in practice, this function has been increasingly assumed by the inhabitants themselves, who have organized security patrols in many villages. UNIFIL is kept informed of these arrangements and facilitates them by permitting designated individuals to carry personal weapons while performing such security duties. Many of the inhabitants are members or supporters of the AMAL Movement, a broadly based Shiite organization that has played an important role in these efforts. AMAL has also been active in the economic and social fields and tries to ensure that the population is provided with basic services, despite the very difficult circumstances.

27. The vast majority of the inhabitants of southern Lebanon want the Israeli occupation to end and peace and order to be restored. Their objectives thus coincide with those of resolution 425 (1978). Moreover, in view of Israel's overwhelming military superiority, they are opposed to operations that could provoke severe retaliation. In general, therefore, they support UNIFIL's efforts to prevent its area being used for hostile activities and they greatly value UNIFIL's humanitarian support, especially its readiness to try to mitigate the harshness of IDF/DFF measures against them. At the same time, however, their resentment of the Israeli occupation, and especially of the treatment meted out to detainees at the IDF/DFF prison and interrogation centre at Khiam, creates a natural sympathy with the various resistance groups. This factor can, overnight, convert normally friendly attitudes towards UNIFIL into bitter hostility if the Force is perceived to be acting against the resistance or to be insufficiently protective of the local population.

28. If the majority in southern Lebanon share the objectives laid down in resolution 425 (1978), there are other Lebanese who do not do so because those objectives imply Israel's right to exist as a State within its internationally recognized boundaries. This view came to the fore in August/September 1986, when an incident at a checkpoint, in which two Lebanese militiamen were killed by a UNIFIL sentry, triggered a series of attacks by groups opposed to resolution 425 (1978). Some of the Palestinian groups in Lebanon are also opposed to UNIFIL's original mandate. They continue from time to time to launch attacks against Israel from Lebanese territory whether by firing rockets or by attempting to infiltrate small groups of armed persons into Israel by land or sea.

29. As for the Israeli authorities, they continue to state that they have no designs on any Lebanese territory, that the ICA is a temporary measure to ensure the security of northern Israel and that it will be maintained only until alternative arrangements can be agreed with a Lebanese Government which is able to exercise effective authority in the area. As the years have passed, Israel's actions have increasingly seemed to belie this position. As the Secretary-General

has reported to the Council, security roads and fences have been constructed in the border areas which result in a de facto realignment of the border; other roads have been constructed to permit the rapid reinforcement of the IDF inside Lebanon; the DFF, which are armed, financed, trained and directed by Israel, have been strengthened; Lebanese captured in clashes with the DFF on Lebanese territory are deported to Israel and sentenced by Israeli courts to long terms of imprisonment; a civilian administration is being installed throughout the ICA irrespective of the wishes of the inhabitants; permits are required for travel between the ICA and the rest of Lebanon, with the result that the ICA is becoming increasingly separate not only militarily but also in economic and social matters. All this has the effect of making the Israeli occupation seem a more permanent arrangement than the Israeli authorities declare to be their intention.

UNIFIL's tasks and concept of operations

30. The Force's tasks and concept of operations in January 1991 are much as they have been throughout its existence. The tasks are twofold: to use its best efforts to maintain the peaceful character of its area of operations; and to provide humanitarian support to the local population.

31. There are a number of difficulties which UNIFIL faces in carrying out these tasks. Much of its area is under Israeli military occupation. The occupation forces and their Lebanese allies are the target of resistance activity which is widely regarded as being legitimate. As a conventional peace-keeping force, UNIFIL has neither the mandate nor the means to prevent either the occupying Power and its Lebanese allies or the Lebanese resistance groups or other armed elements present in southern Lebanon from undertaking hostile activities if they are determined to do so. Moreover UNIFIL has to ensure that it does not itself become a party in the confused conflict which exists in southern Lebanon.

32. The situation in southern Lebanon thus tests to the limit the capability of a peace-keeping operation to fulfil its mandate in an environment where the normal rules of intergovernmental conflict do not apply. UNIFIL's weapons are persuasion, negotiation, the show (but rarely the use) of force and stubborn insistence on its duty to carry out the tasks assigned to it by the Security Council. Its strengths lie in the moral force it possesses as an expression of the will of the international community and in its awareness of the local complexities, its speed of response and the physical protection which it can provide to itself.

33. UNIFIL's operations are based on a network of positions established throughout its area of deployment and manned 24 hours a day, 365 days a year. The positions are of three types: checkpoints, whose function is to control movement on the principal roads in UNIFIL's area; observation posts, whose function is to observe movement on and off the roads; and checkpoints/observation posts which combine the functions of control and observation. All three types of positions work closely together to carry out the Force's tasks. Each is assigned responsibility for ensuring that hostile activities are not undertaken from the area surrounding it. This involves not only keeping watch from the position but also patrolling by foot or vehicle in its vicinity.

34. The procedures employed at checkpoints are to check all, or selected, vehicles and persons for weapons, ammunition or other military equipment; to deny passage to any vehicles or persons carrying such objects; and to prevent forced passage. A second checkpoint is often established at some distance from the first, with responsibility for blocking the road in case of forced entry at the first checkpoint. This technique of blocking positions enables UNIFIL to avoid using weapons in order to stop a vehicle which has forced its way through the first checkpoint.

35. Observation posts also operate in mutually supporting pairs or groups. For instance, an observation post on high ground works in co-ordination with one in a wadi, with the one on the high ground alerting the other if action needs to be taken to intercept suspicious persons moving into the other's area of responsibility. This concept, incidentally, illustrates the difference between peace-keeping and conventional military operations. In the latter, movement can be prevented by positions located only on the high ground from which the terrain can be controlled by fire. This option is not available to peace-keeping operations which therefore have to be present in the wadis and other low ground in order to block unauthorized movement by their physical presence.

36. This system of fixed positions is complemented by reserves, at the battalion and force level, which can be deployed when serious incidents occur or when a position is threatened and requires reinforcement. Reserves are then used to strengthen the operational capability of the position concerned or to make a show of sufficient strength to deter possible aggression against it. In such situations success often depends on the rapidity of UNIFIL's response; the reserves therefore have to be widely deployed in the Force's area.

37. UNIFIL's network of positions and the patrols mounted from them also play a central role in the Force's performance of its humanitarian task. They provide the civilian population with protection and with a source of help if they are subjected to harassment. The positions are able to provide UNIFIL with immediate reports of incursions and to summon UNIFIL's ready reaction forces to block the incursion and prevent abduction or harassment of civilians. The positions' reports of bombardments and other hostile activities against the civilian population provide the basis for UNIFIL's interventions with the Israeli authorities. In the ICA the mobile teams of OGL's military observers also play an important part in monitoring IDF/DFF activities and providing humanitarian support to the population. These teams also have an important role in observing and reporting Israeli encroachments (see S/19318) and other activities in the ICA which have an adverse effect on the day-to-day life of the people.

38. The location of UNIFIL's positions is determined by the following main factors:

(a) Terrain: the terrain in southern Lebanon is densely covered by vegetation on the coastal plains and is characterized in the interior by rocky hills separated by deep wadis. Maintenance of the required surveillance and blocking capability thus requires a large number of observation posts.

(b) Population: during UNIFIL's nearly 13 years of existence, the population in its area has increased. This has been due to the return of refugees who had fled the area during earlier periods of intensive fighting, to migration from other parts of Lebanon and to the return of Lebanese emigrants from Africa and elsewhere.

(c) Weapons: after many years of armed conflict in the area, arms are kept in most households in southern Lebanon. Moreover, the various armed organizations are known to have stored weapons inside UNIFIL's area. This means that checkpoints have to be established inside the area of deployment as well as on its borders.

(d) Road network: the population increase and the consequent increase in economic activity have led to a significant expansion in the road network. As new roads are constructed, new checkpoints have to be established to maintain UNIFIL's control of the movement of vehicles and persons.

(e) Security of UNIFIL personnel: UNIFIL has learned from experience that it is not itself immune from hostile action. Its positions must therefore, as far as possible, be located in a way which minimizes the threat to its personnel if the local population should, for one reason or another, become hostile to UNIFIL.

III. ANALYSIS

Introduction

39. The question of whether the Security Council should continue to keep UNIFIL in being has been addressed at regular intervals in the Secretary-General's reports to the Security Council. These have recommended that UNIFIL's mandate should be extended for four main reasons:

(a) UNIFIL's presence is a symbol of the international community's commitment to the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Lebanon;

(b) The proper remedy for the ills of southern Lebanon remains the one prescribed in resolution 425 (1978), namely withdrawal of Israeli forces and restoration of the Lebanese Government's authority; UNIFIL has an integral role in the application of that remedy;

(c) Meanwhile, UNIFIL succeeds in exercising some degree of control over the level of hostilities in southern Lebanon; this is an important contribution to stability in a dangerously volatile area;

(d) UNIFIL provides a great deal of humanitarian support and protection to the inhabitants of southern Lebanon.

40. The Secretary-General's recommendation has repeatedly been accepted by the Security Council, unanimously in recent years. At the same time various concerns have been expressed about UNIFIL's present situation. One is the continuing presence of Israeli forces in Lebanon and the consequent inability of the Force to carry out its original mandate. Another is the anomaly, already referred to in

paragraph 19 above, which results from giving a peace-keeping force a mandate to prevent its area from being used for hostile activities when those activities include resistance to an occupation against which the Security Council has repeatedly pronounced itself. This poses a difficult question: if, in practice, Israel cannot be persuaded to withdraw its forces from Lebanon as demanded by the Security Council, is UNIFIL justified in preventing resistance groups from using its area for hostile activities, as also required by the Security Council? Concern has also been expressed about the cost of UNIFIL to the Organization (and to the Member States which contribute troops to it). The question is asked whether it is appropriate to continue spending 46 per cent of the resources at present devoted to peace-keeping operations on a Force which, for nearly 13 years, has been prevented from implementing its mandate.

41. The review requested by the Security Council on 31 July 1990 has therefore examined whether it is possible to adjust UNIFIL's scale and deployment in a way that would meet the objectives of:

(a) Maintaining a substantial UNIFIL presence in southern Lebanon;

(b) Maintaining the Security Council's commitment to resolution 425;

(c) Maintaining the Force's ability to control the level of hostilities in southern Lebanon;

(d) Maintaining the Force's ability to provide humanitarian support to the local population;

(e) Correcting, if possible, the anomaly that arises from giving a peace-keeping force a mandate to prevent its area from being used for hostile activities when those activities include resistance to an occupation against which the Security Council has repeatedly pronounced itself;

(f) Reducing the costs of the Force to the United Nations.

42. It must be emphasized that the review has been carried out at a time when it is particularly difficult to judge the likely course of future events in southern Lebanon. On the one hand, there have been hopeful developments, notably the ending of the Lebanese civil war in the Greater Beirut area and the start of a programme to reunite and strengthen the Lebanese Army. On the other hand, Israel has given no indication that it will be ready, in the immediate future, to withdraw its forces completely from southern Lebanon. It must also be assumed that various Lebanese and non-Lebanese groups in Lebanon will continue to wish to use the southern part of the country as a base from which to launch attacks against Israel. It is also likely to take time for the Lebanese Government to be in a position to exercise effective authority in the south. The conclusions of the review are thus short-term ones. It is to be hoped that in the medium term, it will become possible for UNIFIL to implement the mandate originally entrusted to it by deploying down to the international border and that the Lebanese Government will be in a position to take over UNIFIL's area and maintain security there. At that time a new set of options for the Force's scale and deployment will have to be

examined, including a likely expansion of its strength, at least in the initial phases.

Matching scale and deployment to objectives

43. The first objective in paragraph 41 - maintaining a substantial United Nations presence in southern Lebanon - does not dictate any particular size or deployment for UNIFIL. It would be achieved even if the Force were smaller or differently deployed than at present.

44. However, the second objective - maintaining the Security Council's commitment to resolution 425 (1978) - limits the options for changing the Force's deployment. It permits UNIFIL to hand over parts of its area to the Lebanese Army but it also requires it to make every effort to extend its own effective deployment in the direction of the international border.

45. The decision of the Lebanese Government on 19 December 1990 to ask the Army Command to prepare to take over responsibility for security in southern Lebanon and the Western Bekaa and to deploy in all parts of those regions creates the hope that before long UNIFIL will be able to withdraw from the "northwestern area" (as defined at paragraph 22 (a) above) and hand it over to the Lebanese Army. The Army would then maintain security there. This would permit a saving of two companies plus related support elements, i.e. approximately 7.5 per cent of UNIFIL's present infantry strength. As is recognized by the Lebanese Government, the feasibility of this step will depend on the Government's unhindered ability to deploy, rotate, supply and command the unit or units concerned and on those units' ability and willingness to act effectively to maintain security in their area. On this basis, the Government's decision of 19 December 1990 is an important step towards implementation of resolution 425 (1978).

46. On the other side of its area of operation, UNIFIL's policy is to do all it can to extend its effective deployment towards the international border. An important success in this regard was its replacement of the IDF/DFF on the Tallet Huqban in 1987 (see para. 24 above). More recently the Force Commander has established a number of new observation posts south and west of the village of Yatar, an area which has been the scene of frequent clashes between the IDF/DFF and armed elements. So far, it has been possible to effect these changes in deployment within existing manpower resources but, as already noted, a major redeployment into the ICA would almost certainly require an increase in the Force's size at least in the initial stages.

47. The third objective - maintaining the Force's ability to control the level of hostilities in southern Lebanon - requires it to be deployed in strength to those parts of its area in which hostilities are most likely to occur or through which armed persons and warlike material may be moved. UNIFIL's current deployment reflects these requirements, except that it is not possible for UNIFIL to carry out its control functions in the ICA. The only exception to this is the Norwegian battalion sector where, as described in paragraph 22 (d) above, UNIFIL has retained some limited capability to control movements by the DFF as well as by armed elements.

48. The fourth objective - maintaining the Force's ability to provide humanitarian support to the local population - requires UNIFIL to be deployed in those parts of its area where the population is most at risk of being affected by hostilities or harassment. Generally speaking these are the areas where clashes regularly take place between the IDF/DFF and armed elements and where UNIFIL is anyway deployed to exert its control functions. But they also include areas inside the ICA where, for instance, establishment of civil administration offices or forced recruitment to the DFF have been resisted by the local population. In the latter areas the humanitarian objective constitutes a strong reason for UNIFIL to retain certain positions whose strictly military usefulness may be limited.

49. The fifth objective is to correct, if possible, the anomaly that arises from giving a peace-keeping force a mandate to prevent its area from being used for hostile activities when those activities include resistance to an occupation against which the Security Council has repeatedly pronounced itself. The obvious way to correct this anomaly would be for Israel to withdraw its forces completely from Lebanese territory. Until this happens, however, UNIFIL will continue to face difficult and sensitive questions which relate more to its mandate and method of operation than to its scale and deployment. Its efforts to control armed elements have led over the years to many dangerous, and some fatal, confrontations. But for UNIFIL to abandon those efforts would be contrary to the mandate given to the Force by the Security Council. It would also be contrary to the wishes of the local population, the great majority of whom, while resenting the Israeli occupation, value UNIFIL's efforts to control the level of violence around them, efforts which enable them to lead their daily lives in some degree of security. The review accordingly reached the same conclusion on this question as that contained in the Secretary-General's statement of 27 February 1985, namely that "there is no easy solution to the dilemma of UNIFIL" and pending an end to the current difficulties in the interest of all concerned, "the only course for UNIFIL is to maintain its presence and to continue within its limited means to carry out its existing functions in the area" (S/17093, para. 24).

50. The sixth objective is to reduce the cost of UNIFIL to the Organization. It has been argued above that the third and fourth objectives - maintaining the Force's ability to control the level of hostilities and to provide humanitarian support to the local population - require it to remain deployed in the areas where it is at present. But there remain the questions of whether the current number of positions are required and whether they need to be manned at their current strength.

51. On the first question, the deployment of UNIFIL's positions is a dynamic process. The Force Commander conducts comprehensive inspections of each battalion twice a year. One of the main purposes of these inspections is to assess the continued requirement for each position in the light of changing operational, economic, demographic and security factors. As a result the pattern of positions is constantly changing: in the current mandate period, for instance, 11 positions (some 6 per cent of the total) were closed and 8 new positions were opened.

52. As regards the strength of positions, the Force Commander has undertaken a study to establish the ideal strength for each of the three types of positions described in paragraph 33 above. In practice, it is not possible within the

Force's existing strength to man each position at the ideal level; on average each position's strength is 10 per cent below that level.

53. The review accordingly concluded that it is not advisable to reduce either the number of positions or the number of personnel deployed in those positions. It did, however, identify certain other measures which could be taken to reduce the cost of UNIFIL to the Organization.

Measures to streamline UNIFIL

54. The core of the UNIFIL operation consists of its six infantry battalions, which at present account for 72 per cent of the Force's military personnel. They man the positions and conduct patrols which enable UNIFIL to control its area of operations. It is their requirements which largely determine the nature and strength of the support elements at Force headquarters and in the field. The review has therefore concentrated its attention on them, on the understanding that when their strength and organization have been determined, consequential adjustments can be made to the support elements.

55. The review examined how UNIFIL's infantry element could best be organized to maximize the ratio of line troops to headquarters and support elements. Two options in particular have been examined: to standardize on large battalions of five line companies each, a model which was successfully employed in the United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) in Namibia; or to standardize on battalions of three line companies each, while placing limits on the strength of their headquarters and support elements which the troop-contributing Governments would be asked to observe. The Force Commander believes that, in the operational conditions existing in southern Lebanon, battalions of five line companies would be unwieldy and difficult to command. He has recommended that the most practicable organization is a 645-man battalion, with three line companies of three platoons each. This gives a ratio of 465 in the line companies to 180 headquarters/support troops (or 72:28).

56. The organization of the six existing battalions does not conform to this model; the strength of their headquarters and support elements ranges between 43 per cent and 34 per cent of total battalion strength. The reason for the size of the current battalion's headquarters and support elements is that when UNIFIL was first established the Secretary-General asked the troop-contributing Governments to provide their infantry battalions with a high degree of self-sufficiency, given that in those early days the Force itself had only a limited capability to meet the battalion's logistic requirements. This is no longer the case and the battalions' headquarters and support elements may now be larger than is strictly required. It is accordingly recommended that the troop-contributing Governments be asked to adhere as closely as possible to the organization proposed by the Force Commander and to ensure in particular that the ratio of headquarters and support elements to line troops does not exceed 30 per cent at either the company or the battalion level. This reorganization should produce savings of some 390 men (9 per cent of UNIFIL's current infantry strength).

57. The Force Commander has further recommended that the infantry battalions should no longer be equipped with heavy mortars. Given the density of population in UNIFIL's area, these weapons would not be appropriate for the Force to use in self-defence because of the high risk of civilian casualties. They have in fact never been used for this purpose and are currently used only for illumination, a function which can be provided more economically by other means.

58. The Force Commander has further advised that, following the establishment of a Force Mobile Reserve equipped with armoured personnel carriers, he no longer has a requirement for an armoured escort company based at his headquarters in Naqoura. This company at present forms part of the composite French battalion which was redeployed to Naqoura in late 1986. As a result of certain restrictions on its deployment in the UNIFIL area of operation which have been in force since then, its escort functions have increasingly been assumed by the infantry battalions, all of which are now equipped with armoured personnel carriers, and by the Force Mobile Reserve. It is recommended that the Government of France be asked to withdraw this unit. This will produce savings of 116, all ranks.

IV. SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS

59. The following recommendations are submitted:

(a) For the time being, there should be no substantive change in UNIFIL's functions nor in its deployment;

(b) The Force should continue its contact with the Lebanese authorities with a view to handing the northwestern part of its area of operation over to the Lebanese Army. Further, in the hope that conditions will soon exist for UNIFIL to carry out its original mandate, the Force should maintain contingency plans for its deployment to the international border and for the progressive transfer to the Lebanese Government of responsibility for its area; this process may well require, initially at any rate, an increase in the Force's strength;

(c) Meanwhile, certain measures should be taken to streamline the Force, namely:

(i) Reduction in the size of the headquarters and support elements of the six infantry battalions;

(ii) Withdrawal of the heavy mortars with which some of the battalions are equipped;

(iii) Withdrawal of the armoured escort company at present deployed at Force Headquarters in Naqoura.

These measures should produce a saving of some 10 per cent in the Force's military strength.